WEBVTT NOTE Automatic transcript with corrections to names and technical terms. May contain transcription errors. 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.100 Meet yourself and tell us what you're going to talk about. 00:00:04.180 --> 00:00:06.040 Yeah, I'm Rick Carback. 00:00:06.180 --> 00:00:08.420 I work with Quantum Computers now. 00:00:09.120 --> 00:00:12.740 In Zcash land, I'm best known as a mixnet guy. 00:00:14.580 --> 00:00:20.820 My fondest memory, well, fondest and sort of most regrettable memory with Zcash is 00:00:20.820 --> 00:00:23.020 I came to a conference much like this. 00:00:23.700 --> 00:00:28.040 And about an hour before I was supposed to talk, they had announced. 00:00:28.960 --> 00:00:32.400 I forget who it was, but we wanted the Tornado Cash or Samourai Wallet guys, got 00:00:32.400 --> 00:00:33.120 arrested. 00:00:34.160 --> 00:00:39.590 And I was going to announce how I was planning to launch my mixnet for like five 00:00:39.590 --> 00:00:41.680 cents a transaction. 00:00:42.240 --> 00:00:45.380 We could put Shield and Zcash transactions through the mixnet. 00:00:45.700 --> 00:00:50.820 And I was told in sort of no uncertain terms by an unlisted number, if you make 00:00:50.820 --> 00:00:54.600 money on crypto right now, the government will come after you. 00:00:54.740 --> 00:00:56.180 You are a U.S. citizen, you're okay. 00:00:56.540 --> 00:00:59.520 And I was like, shit, okay, not going to announce that. 00:00:59.880 --> 00:01:02.880 So that's my fun Zcash story for you. 00:01:03.280 --> 00:01:06.280 I know one of the previous speakers said, you know, sometimes it feels like the 00:01:06.280 --> 00:01:07.760 deck is stacked against you. 00:01:08.160 --> 00:01:11.040 And then especially the private space, that is true. 00:01:11.420 --> 00:01:16.040 There is government activity and they're trying to suppress it sometimes. 00:01:16.160 --> 00:01:17.080 Sometimes they're not. 00:01:17.560 --> 00:01:18.060 I don't know. 00:01:18.580 --> 00:01:21.970 You know, I think today, these days, if you're sort of a large project and you're 00:01:21.970 --> 00:01:26.840 doing a lot of different things, you know, we're going to hear from Nym after my 00:01:26.840 --> 00:01:28.080 speech, I believe. 00:01:28.520 --> 00:01:32.260 And they're doing exactly what I was proposing all those years ago. 00:01:33.000 --> 00:01:39.020 But these days, and academically, I'm sorry, I didn't finish my intro, I did a lot 00:01:39.020 --> 00:01:40.340 of civic tech. 00:01:40.340 --> 00:01:46.940 So my PhD thesis is in privacy enhancing electronic voting systems. 00:01:47.100 --> 00:01:51.330 So you get a receipt when you vote, but it doesn't prove how you vote, which 00:01:51.330 --> 00:01:53.240 obviously is a mixnet based platform. 00:01:53.600 --> 00:01:55.320 So that's a little bit about me. 00:01:55.740 --> 00:01:57.980 These days, I work in quantum computers. 00:01:58.440 --> 00:02:02.640 We are largely building a platform to sell quantum compute. 00:02:02.820 --> 00:02:06.220 We're building the world's shared quantum computer because you can take qubits, and 00:02:06.220 --> 00:02:08.420 we've heard of this term called entanglement. 00:02:08.840 --> 00:02:10.780 You can entangle qubits across the pistons. 00:02:10.780 --> 00:02:15.870 And what that means is we take different quantum computer installations and entangle 00:02:15.870 --> 00:02:18.300 the qubits across fiber optic cable. 00:02:18.720 --> 00:02:21.520 So our ultimate goal, our vision, is to be that. 00:02:23.540 --> 00:02:27.770 So for those of you who are Zcash people and you're worried about privacy, the too 00:02:27.770 --> 00:02:30.980 long, didn't watch, didn't pay attention to this presentation, 00:02:31.300 --> 00:02:37.500 is switch to Orchard and hope that NU7 comes quicker than it's been coming. 00:02:38.080 --> 00:02:42.310 And be ready to upgrade anytime there's an upgrade so that you are on NU7 as fast 00:02:42.310 --> 00:02:43.240 as possible. 00:02:43.760 --> 00:02:48.540 And hope that they actually fix things in NU8 or NU9 of the protocol. 00:02:49.100 --> 00:02:53.340 Because Zcash has problems, and I'll be telling you to wake up. 00:02:53.340 --> 00:03:02.920 So the problem here is quantum computers can break ECC crypto. 00:03:03.320 --> 00:03:08.090 ECC crypto is what essentially all modern privacy technology is built on with a few 00:03:08.090 --> 00:03:09.180 exceptions. 00:03:09.580 --> 00:03:13.780 So hash-based ZK-STARKs are one of the exceptions. 00:03:13.980 --> 00:03:14.920 There's very few of them. 00:03:15.780 --> 00:03:20.260 The trade-off tends to be when you're using these hash-based methods, key sizes are 00:03:20.260 --> 00:03:23.300 massive, the resources required are significant. 00:03:23.940 --> 00:03:26.060 So that's sort of the problem we're dealing with here. 00:03:27.360 --> 00:03:32.430 The other problem is everyone thinks that it's like 5, 10, well, the current 00:03:32.430 --> 00:03:34.300 thinking is 5 years away. 00:03:35.800 --> 00:03:40.820 The thinking up until about 2024 was that it was always 20 years away. 00:03:41.460 --> 00:03:45.020 And the last 3 years, it went from 10 years to 5 years. 00:03:45.380 --> 00:03:49.800 And my personal opinion, that's my website, thequantumdoomclock.com, is if you look 00:03:49.800 --> 00:03:53.600 at the exponential growth, if you look at the error correction rate improvements 00:03:53.600 --> 00:03:54.960 over the last couple of years, 00:03:54.960 --> 00:03:59.190 you're seeing two years, you're seeing two things exponentially growing in opposite 00:03:59.190 --> 00:04:03.470 directions, and you're going to enter this gray space in 2028, specifically March 00:04:03.470 --> 00:04:05.760 2028, according to the raw data I have, 00:04:06.460 --> 00:04:09.950 where it's not going to be clear that a quantum computer is in that state where it 00:04:09.950 --> 00:04:11.280 can break crypto or not. 00:04:11.780 --> 00:04:14.870 And then after that point, you just kind of have to throw your hands up in the air 00:04:14.870 --> 00:04:17.820 and say, maybe what I'm doing is broken, but maybe it's fine. 00:04:18.220 --> 00:04:20.460 And hopefully a few years later, we'll find out one way or the other. 00:04:21.100 --> 00:04:24.500 A great example of this kind of thing that happened most recently, about two months 00:04:24.500 --> 00:04:26.300 ago, Google released a paper. 00:04:26.860 --> 00:04:31.280 They said, oh, we've published the required number of logical qubits. 00:04:31.480 --> 00:04:34.100 So there's this concept of a logical versus a physical qubit. 00:04:35.060 --> 00:04:38.000 You used to need, like, several hundred thousand physical qubits. 00:04:38.180 --> 00:04:39.500 That was 2024's number. 00:04:40.580 --> 00:04:41.880 2026's number is 30. 00:04:42.840 --> 00:04:44.660 So that's a big improvement. 00:04:45.300 --> 00:04:46.800 And that's from Alice and Bob. 00:04:46.900 --> 00:04:49.420 They say they're going to release a computer by the end of the year, but they're 00:04:49.420 --> 00:04:52.280 going to be able to implement a logical qubit in 30 physical qubits. 00:04:53.460 --> 00:04:58.890 So the logical qubit count required went from about 1,800 to break ECC all the way 00:04:58.890 --> 00:05:04.180 down to about 1,400 in their numbers, 13 to 1,400 in their numbers. 00:05:04.600 --> 00:05:07.700 And now it's 40% lower two months later. 00:05:07.940 --> 00:05:11.440 And they published all this under a zero-knowledge proof, but people figured out 00:05:11.440 --> 00:05:15.480 how to, like, essentially get around that because there's enough public information 00:05:15.480 --> 00:05:17.440 that just derived the right process. 00:05:18.280 --> 00:05:22.420 So we're already 44% data from Google's numbers two months ago. 00:05:22.560 --> 00:05:24.520 So this is kind of, like, the exponential problem. 00:05:25.100 --> 00:05:28.300 And then the person who has been the most vocal and the person all the news 00:05:28.300 --> 00:05:33.280 articles cite saying, oh, quantum computers are always 20 years away from crypto. 00:05:33.940 --> 00:05:38.300 He just published that three months ago saying, don't say I didn't warn you. 00:05:38.400 --> 00:05:40.160 Look, I don't know what's going to happen the next couple of years. 00:05:40.700 --> 00:05:45.020 So with that, you know, this is just illustrating the point. 00:05:45.160 --> 00:05:49.400 Like, yeah, it looks really flat until you see you get a little bit more 00:05:49.400 --> 00:05:51.900 progressive and everything builds on it. 00:05:52.760 --> 00:05:54.720 We're finance people here mostly. 00:05:54.960 --> 00:05:56.960 I hope we would understand, like, compound interest. 00:05:57.420 --> 00:05:59.660 But, like, this is, like, compound interest on steroids. 00:05:59.820 --> 00:06:03.260 It's literally a doubling or a tripling in the span of the year. 00:06:04.300 --> 00:06:07.020 So, and we don't have very far to go. 00:06:07.200 --> 00:06:11.430 These are numbers from 2025 when it was, like, about a billion physical qubits that 00:06:11.430 --> 00:06:12.080 you needed. 00:06:12.540 --> 00:06:15.620 Now it's, like, a little closer to, like, $600. 00:06:17.000 --> 00:06:20.620 So those lines are going lower and the number of qubits is going up. 00:06:22.880 --> 00:06:26.380 Since this is a technical audience, I actually get to teach you, like, why and how 00:06:26.380 --> 00:06:28.380 quantum computers work. 00:06:28.560 --> 00:06:33.410 So what this slide is showing you is essentially, like, an adder array gate on a 00:06:33.410 --> 00:06:34.860 quantum computer. 00:06:35.440 --> 00:06:40.910 And we are doing this thing where we are looking at these three-minute inputs and 00:06:40.910 --> 00:06:44.180 we're determining whether they're constant or balanced using those definitions on 00:06:44.180 --> 00:06:44.680 the screen. 00:06:44.820 --> 00:06:45.620 I'll let you read that. 00:06:46.080 --> 00:06:50.390 And when you run the quantum computer, you run this Atomar transform gate on all 00:06:50.390 --> 00:06:51.160 things. 00:06:51.320 --> 00:06:52.660 You run the function. 00:06:53.340 --> 00:06:54.920 You run the Atomar transfer gate again. 00:06:55.060 --> 00:06:58.480 And you do this, like, little twist on them. 00:06:58.760 --> 00:07:00.160 And then you read it and you get the answer. 00:07:00.660 --> 00:07:02.400 So how many times does that algorithm run? 00:07:03.520 --> 00:07:06.300 So the circuit lights up, runs through it once. 00:07:07.340 --> 00:07:12.140 Now, when we make the problem bigger, like, let's say we're going to do four bits 00:07:12.140 --> 00:07:14.260 as opposed to three bits. 00:07:14.780 --> 00:07:17.100 Yeah, I need another qubit, right? 00:07:17.100 --> 00:07:22.290 But it's a constant time algorithm, whereas this is going to explode exponentially, 00:07:22.290 --> 00:07:22.960 right? 00:07:23.020 --> 00:07:26.570 So it's a massive amount of additional work that you would have to do on a 00:07:26.570 --> 00:07:27.860 classical computer. 00:07:28.620 --> 00:07:33.250 And what you're doing, like, the mental model you should have with quantum is, like, 00:07:33.250 --> 00:07:36.000 a 2D grid and, like, a line, right? 00:07:36.060 --> 00:07:39.650 And a classical computer has to go a little bit in the X direction, a little bit in 00:07:39.650 --> 00:07:41.920 the Y direction to get to the end state value. 00:07:42.400 --> 00:07:44.440 And the quantum computer just goes right there in one step. 00:07:44.980 --> 00:07:48.140 And that's not true, like, generally speaking, for all algorithms. 00:07:48.620 --> 00:07:52.090 But there do exist this class of algorithms of which the discrete log problem was 00:07:52.090 --> 00:07:54.140 one of them that caused this problem. 00:07:56.600 --> 00:07:59.880 The great thing about it is that this is going to change the world, right? 00:08:00.000 --> 00:08:03.340 So there's applications in finance, there's applications in logistics. 00:08:04.160 --> 00:08:08.370 If you were here two days ago at the hackathon, we showed you finance optimization 00:08:08.370 --> 00:08:12.870 where we did, we figured out what crypto was optimal to use to buy your bit refill 00:08:12.870 --> 00:08:13.540 cards. 00:08:14.260 --> 00:08:17.680 We used the actual quantum computer that we have access to. 00:08:18.660 --> 00:08:21.200 So it can run these problems right now. 00:08:21.900 --> 00:08:25.380 I mean, obviously, you can run either a simulation or the exact same computation 00:08:25.380 --> 00:08:28.140 classically right now, and it's about the same. 00:08:28.580 --> 00:08:32.980 But once you get past about 50 qubits, it becomes impossible to do the simulation. 00:08:33.280 --> 00:08:38.560 And then you, on the classical side, to keep up, you have to start doing, you know, 00:08:38.560 --> 00:08:41.840 estimations of the algorithm for it to work. 00:08:44.840 --> 00:08:49.140 In privacy, we have a bigger problem, which is harvest now, detriple later. 00:08:50.580 --> 00:08:55.710 Ten years ago, I said, oh, well, we'll do some things where we'll do some hash-based 00:08:55.710 --> 00:08:58.600 signatures, and then the signatures will be secure. 00:09:00.920 --> 00:09:05.210 And for key agreement, we'll add some things in there to sort of prevent it from 00:09:05.210 --> 00:09:08.240 being breakable after the fact. 00:09:09.060 --> 00:09:14.280 And I, you know, proposed some things, wrote some things, published some code, and 00:09:14.280 --> 00:09:17.520 said, well, it's probably 30, 40 years away still. 00:09:17.820 --> 00:09:20.480 I'll be dead, most likely, or I'll be retired. 00:09:20.600 --> 00:09:21.580 It's not going to matter to me. 00:09:21.740 --> 00:09:26.160 And, in fact, in grad school, I literally had a professor say, we're going to talk 00:09:26.160 --> 00:09:29.960 about quantum computers today and why they're relevant to crypto. 00:09:30.300 --> 00:09:31.040 It's like one lecture. 00:09:31.460 --> 00:09:32.440 And he said, don't worry about it. 00:09:32.440 --> 00:09:33.220 It's probably not you. 00:09:33.280 --> 00:09:36.300 It's going to be your students or their students that are going to be worried about 00:09:36.300 --> 00:09:36.680 this. 00:09:37.320 --> 00:09:40.020 So I never really thought I would be here in this moment. 00:09:41.300 --> 00:09:46.280 So the hardest now to encrypt later problem is we can take encrypted data today, 00:09:46.280 --> 00:09:51.490 like the Zcash transaction, the Shielded Zcash transaction that we did earlier at 00:09:51.490 --> 00:09:53.540 the beginning of the talks. 00:09:54.020 --> 00:10:00.260 And we can look at that encrypted data and we can uncover what was happening there 00:10:00.260 --> 00:10:05.320 after the fact, which all crypto kind of has that vulnerability. 00:10:05.720 --> 00:10:08.780 But typically we say, oh, it's going to be 30, 50, 100 years. 00:10:08.940 --> 00:10:13.060 That's like a cryptographer gets uncomfortable when you say it's going to be computable 00:10:13.060 --> 00:10:13.960 in 30 years. 00:10:14.420 --> 00:10:18.920 They're generally comfortable once you say it's decryptable in like 50 to 100 years. 00:10:18.920 --> 00:10:23.580 So it's like that tends to be what most crypto is rated for and it's like 30 to 100 00:10:23.580 --> 00:10:24.200 years. 00:10:25.760 --> 00:10:28.810 But we're going to be in this period, probably in the next five to 10 years where 00:10:28.810 --> 00:10:33.300 everything the previous five to 10 years was is going to be decryptable. 00:10:35.040 --> 00:10:39.270 And that's a big problem for privacy crypto, because basically all of it, with a 00:10:39.270 --> 00:10:43.280 couple of exceptions, is vulnerable in one way or another. 00:10:43.700 --> 00:10:45.760 Proof systems, that's CK proofs. 00:10:46.240 --> 00:10:48.200 The stars are not vulnerable because they're hash based. 00:10:48.920 --> 00:10:54.370 Message anonymizers, anonymous authentication systems, confidential ledgers, that 00:10:54.370 --> 00:10:56.080 would be Zcash, Monero. 00:10:57.080 --> 00:10:59.150 We're going to talk, deep Zcash is special, so we're going to talk a little bit 00:10:59.150 --> 00:11:01.000 about that in the next couple of slides. 00:11:01.700 --> 00:11:04.940 Multiparty computation, threshold encryption is vulnerable. 00:11:05.700 --> 00:11:09.930 And then encrypted aggregators, so like groups, signature type things, they're 00:11:09.930 --> 00:11:11.140 generally vulnerable. 00:11:11.980 --> 00:11:16.740 And there are essentially not a lot of solutions available right now. 00:11:16.740 --> 00:11:22.400 There are solutions available for the signatures, and there are solutions available 00:11:22.400 --> 00:11:25.400 for, you know, key agreement right now. 00:11:25.400 --> 00:11:32.510 That's what NIST has approved, but they rely on algebraic constructions that just 00:11:32.510 --> 00:11:37.820 haven't been figured out or just aren't workable in the current ecosystem yet. 00:11:38.540 --> 00:11:41.140 So let's think about Zcash specifically. 00:11:41.140 --> 00:11:47.530 So these three boxes, transparent transactions, if you use it, your funds are 00:11:47.530 --> 00:11:51.320 stolen in the context of a quantum computer. 00:11:51.320 --> 00:11:56.780 If you're using Sprout or Sapling, you're, in some cases, your funds are taken, in 00:11:56.780 --> 00:12:02.040 some cases, we're able to, like, counterfeit funds in the shielding pool. 00:12:02.760 --> 00:12:06.460 There is a protection in Zcash where you can't take out more funds than went into 00:12:06.460 --> 00:12:10.400 the shielding pool, but that's just, like, you're the bag holder. 00:12:10.980 --> 00:12:12.300 Like, that's not a real protection. 00:12:12.860 --> 00:12:14.220 So be aware of that. 00:12:14.600 --> 00:12:21.280 On Orchard, the proof system is broken, but the privacy, if you never publish the 00:12:21.280 --> 00:12:26.460 spending key, which when you put the QR code, spending the money, you publish the 00:12:26.460 --> 00:12:29.980 spending key, is protected if you never publish. 00:12:29.980 --> 00:12:33.160 So now, your public keys are, essentially, you have to treat them like secrets. 00:12:33.760 --> 00:12:36.820 So if you treat your public keys like secrets and you're using Orchard, you're, 00:12:36.820 --> 00:12:40.870 generally speaking, going to be okay on the privacy side, but the proof system is 00:12:40.870 --> 00:12:43.600 going to fail when a quantum computer comes over. 00:12:45.280 --> 00:12:47.160 And U7 fixes that. 00:12:48.120 --> 00:12:49.660 There's two main things. 00:12:50.280 --> 00:12:52.160 Tachyon is the one that fixes the privacy. 00:12:52.320 --> 00:12:55.000 They just remove the note effectively. 00:12:55.400 --> 00:12:58.370 I mean, I'm oversimplifying it, but they remove the note that would make it 00:12:58.370 --> 00:12:59.720 possible to do the dicker. 00:12:59.980 --> 00:13:03.240 To break the key that would enable you to de-anonymize the transaction. 00:13:03.980 --> 00:13:08.220 And then on the left side, there's the Zip 2005, which will recover the funds, and 00:13:08.220 --> 00:13:09.440 contract your funds. 00:13:10.060 --> 00:13:14.160 But there's still this proof soundness problem that is opening the air. 00:13:15.040 --> 00:13:17.960 And hopefully, I think that there's time to fix it. 00:13:18.120 --> 00:13:22.800 I think, you know, we do, even on my most aggressive timeline, March 2028, that's 00:13:22.800 --> 00:13:25.080 still two years, about two years away. 00:13:25.520 --> 00:13:27.820 I do think we're going to be, generally speaking, okay. 00:13:29.980 --> 00:13:33.340 So, just, this is the takeaway of the talk. 00:13:33.600 --> 00:13:37.860 Orchard preserves privacy, but a quantum computer can still break that proof system. 00:13:38.040 --> 00:13:39.240 And that's what we need to be worried about. 00:13:41.480 --> 00:13:42.560 What do we do about it? 00:13:43.020 --> 00:13:47.840 I'll just say that privacy techniques go back a long way prior to crypto. 00:13:48.980 --> 00:13:55.220 There's a famous, you know, principle from a guy named Kirchhoff from 1883, and Claude 00:13:55.220 --> 00:13:56.060 Shannon. 00:13:56.720 --> 00:13:58.600 Do you guys know Shannon entropy? 00:13:59.040 --> 00:14:02.880 Or, like, the imitation game? 00:14:03.820 --> 00:14:05.600 Like, or the movie? 00:14:05.820 --> 00:14:10.600 Like, just the guy that sort of invented a lot of, like, the base principles of 00:14:10.600 --> 00:14:11.800 cryptography. 00:14:12.260 --> 00:14:16.880 And a lot of mathematics, as well, he coined the phrase, the enemy knows the system. 00:14:17.480 --> 00:14:19.720 So, you have to operate as if the enemy knows the system. 00:14:20.140 --> 00:14:21.540 And we know that very well. 00:14:21.820 --> 00:14:23.440 And this is sort of the general advice. 00:14:24.080 --> 00:14:25.660 I already told you the first one. 00:14:25.920 --> 00:14:28.360 Public keys are our secrets now, so treat them as such. 00:14:29.460 --> 00:14:30.800 You know, compartmentalization. 00:14:31.240 --> 00:14:34.570 We had a great example of that, where you have to share your viewing key on one of 00:14:34.570 --> 00:14:35.380 the tools. 00:14:36.100 --> 00:14:39.880 And so, the general advice is, use this for your public storefront. 00:14:39.960 --> 00:14:41.860 Use a separate wallet for everything else. 00:14:42.120 --> 00:14:43.160 I think that's really good advice. 00:14:44.320 --> 00:14:44.760 Suit it in. 00:14:44.880 --> 00:14:45.820 So, build a wallet. 00:14:46.100 --> 00:14:47.060 Use it for a transaction. 00:14:47.280 --> 00:14:47.840 Throw it away. 00:14:48.000 --> 00:14:49.220 Don't keep things around too long. 00:14:50.200 --> 00:14:53.620 Again, upgrade, upgrade, upgrade, especially when new crypto comes out. 00:14:54.100 --> 00:14:57.290 I know that there's kind of a double-edged sword in that the new crypto is 00:14:57.290 --> 00:14:59.280 generally not, is less trustworthy. 00:14:59.640 --> 00:15:04.220 This is one of those cases where I would just upgrade immediately, because, 00:15:04.220 --> 00:15:05.280 especially after 2028, 00:15:06.100 --> 00:15:07.760 I just don't know what's going to happen. 00:15:07.880 --> 00:15:10.680 We can walk computers and minimize the expires. 00:15:10.780 --> 00:15:12.600 It's just kind of a summary of everything I just talked about. 00:15:14.100 --> 00:15:15.340 There are cryptographers. 00:15:15.580 --> 00:15:18.020 They are working on solutions in general. 00:15:18.680 --> 00:15:21.220 The resources required are significantly more. 00:15:23.220 --> 00:15:27.560 And the confidential ledgers is the biggest one that I'm worried about. 00:15:27.900 --> 00:15:31.260 But, you know, I think that it is possible to solve these problems. 00:15:31.360 --> 00:15:32.860 I just don't know how it's going to play out. 00:15:33.320 --> 00:15:34.240 So, I'm not worried. 00:15:34.300 --> 00:15:37.420 On the long tail of crypto, in general, I'm an optimist. 00:15:37.480 --> 00:15:42.420 But I will tell you, in 2024, when I realized, like, the trend that we were seeing, 00:15:42.420 --> 00:15:43.900 I went 00:15:43.900 --> 00:15:46.980 through a very deep, dark period of about three months where I just disappeared. 00:15:47.240 --> 00:15:50.210 And I was like, man, everything I've been working on my whole career is, like, 00:15:50.210 --> 00:15:50.980 bullshit now. 00:15:51.700 --> 00:15:53.820 And it took a while to get over that. 00:15:53.940 --> 00:15:56.140 And I realized, well, these things are really cool. 00:15:56.320 --> 00:15:57.260 They do a lot of neat stuff. 00:15:57.700 --> 00:16:01.180 And they're going to have commercial applicability probably in the next year or so. 00:16:01.440 --> 00:16:02.320 I think that's really cool. 00:16:03.920 --> 00:16:08.840 With that, questions, I'm on Signal. 00:16:09.420 --> 00:16:10.240 You can find me. 00:16:10.460 --> 00:16:12.460 And I think I brought my business card. 00:16:12.560 --> 00:16:13.980 I'll hand this out, too, if anyone's interested. 00:16:13.980 --> 00:16:16.720 Thank you so much.